Eventualities and worlds are analysed uniformly as schedules of certain descriptions of eventuality-types (reversing the reduction of eventuality-types to eventualities). The temporal interpretation of modals in Condoravdi 2002 is reformulated to bring out what it is about eventualities and worlds that is essential to the account. What is essential, it is claimed, can be recovered from schedules that may or may not include worlds.
INTRODUCTION
Just as semantic accounts of modality commonly invoke possible worlds, theories of temporality (concerning, for instance, aspect) often appeal to eventualities. But what are eventualities? And what are worlds? The present work analyses eventualities and worlds uniformly as certain relations s 4 TI 3 ED between a set TI of times t and a set ED of eventuality-descriptions u, with sðt; uÞ pronounced 's schedules u at t: '
Insofar as eventuality-descriptions apply to eventuality-types, we may call s a schedule of eventuality-types. Exactly what eventualitydescriptions are and how they pick out eventuality-types depend on the application at hand: the fragment of English to be analysed, and the bit of reality that is conceptualised (to serve that end). In particular, we may derive ED from certain words and phrases under consideration, while basing eventuality-types on additional conceptualisations of, for instance, time.
A concrete and illuminating illustration is provided by the temporal interpretation of modals in Condoravdi 2002, henceforth CON2 . Some sentences with which CON2 is concerned are listed in (1).
(1) a. He might be here right now.
b. He might be here any day now. c. He might be here next week. d. Ã He might be here yesterday.
(4) a. MIGHT (PERF (she-win)) b. PERF (MIGHT (she-win))
Flying against the surface form (4a) of (2), the scoping of the perfect over might in (4b) is not uncontroversial. It is, however, crucial in CON2 for imposing historical necessity on (3b)/(4b) relative to a notion of history shifted towards an earlier point in the past. But is (4b) based on a flawed interpretation of the perfect? To understand this question, let us examine some of the assumptions underlying CON2. CON2 draws on a generous inventory of worlds, states, events and times to form, on the one hand, eventive and stative properties, and, on the other hand, temporal properties. As made precise in section 3 below, eventive and stative properties serve as interpretations of eventuality-descriptions. To interpret the modals and the perfect, CON2 steps up to temporal properties, replacing the specific states and events in stative and eventive properties by times, alongside worlds that figure in all properties. Now, it is easy enough to convert a stative or eventive property to a temporal property by mapping states or events to their temporal trace. Going back from a temporal property to a stative or eventive one, however, runs into the problem that too many states and events may have the same temporal trace. For instance, does an interpretation of (5) as a temporal property allow us to extract the consequent state of Pat being away (left out from CON2, which focuses on the so-called existential perfect)?
(5) Pat has left.
And if we were to sharpen the temporal property interpreting PERF(A) to a stative property, could PERF still scope over MIGHT as in (4b)? Not if PERF were to require states or events (in its inputs), whereas MIGHT returns times (in its outputs). Under the reformulation below, the opposition between temporal properties and stative/ eventive properties evaporates. The world-time pairs in temporal properties become schedules, encompassing worlds and eventualities alike. (4b) is kept viable, and so the reader wishing to rule out (4b) must seek other grounds for doing so.
The reformulation of CON2 below is intended as a first step at pinning down the semantic entities CON2's modals and perfect characterise-a first step, that is, to isolating what Schubert (2000) calls characterised situations. The main thrust is to strip world-time pairs down to the essentials-or, at least, to schedules, from which, it is claimed, the essentials can be extracted. This is carried out below in three steps, outlined in Table 1 .
We proceed in the next section, section 2, from the semantic set-up in CON2, converting worlds into schedules in section 3. We introduce schedules other than those induced by worlds in section 4, before making do without world-induced schedules in section 5. Precisely what the symbols in Table 1 mean will be explained in due course. That said, let us note at the outset that appeals to forcing y (as in sections 4 and 5) are not new in philosophical semantics, stretching at least as far back as van Fraassen (1969) . Forcing lurks at the background of the data semantics of Veltman (1984) , where its impact is diminished by the failure of (what is termed there) 'stability.' Stability relates to (3) above roughly as follows. (3b) is stable insofar as it is tenable even if we accept that she did not win.
(6) She might have at an earlier point won (had she followed my advice . . .), but she didn't.
By contrast, accepting she did not win makes (3a) untenable and, in that sense, unstable.
(7) a. She didn't win.
Ã
But for all we know now, she might have. b. She didn't win. But she might have (had she . . .). 
Section 2
Given: temporal property (from CON2) u(w)(t) Section 3
Step 1: turn world w into schedule s w (satisfies~) s w , t~u Section 4
Step 2: generalize s w to smaller schedules s (forces y) s y t, u Section 5
Step 3: reconstruct s w from (generic) set G of schedules
More formally, stability coincides in section 4 below with the persistence of y relative to the subset relation 4 on schedules s, s# s y t; u and s 4 s# implies s# y t; u:
Persistence is indispensable to the application we shall make of forcing (e.g. Proposition 3, section 5). Now, while (3b)/(6), (7b) may pose no problem for persistence, (3a)/(7a) is a different matter. Suppose s forced (3a) and s# encoded she lost, whereas s did not. Then surely s# could not force (3a)? In fact, it could, provided we analyze epistemic might not as in Veltman 1984's data semantics, but more along the lines of Veltman's (1996) update semantics. Dropping t for the sake of clarity (at the cost of correctness) and writing AEeaeu for 'might epistemically u,' let s y AEeaeu iff ðds# 2 RÞ s# y u for some set R of schedules specifying the epistemic possibilities of y (without regard to s). As s appears only in the left side (not the right) of the biconditional, we can restore t to get (8), 1 making persistence with respect to AEeaeu unproblematic.
(8) For all schedules s, s# in the domain of y, s y t; AEeaeu iff s# y t; AEeaeu:
What then becomes of the instability in (7a)? Rather than analysing (7a) in terms of a single non-persistent forcing relation y, we appeal to context change of the kind advocated in Veltman (1996) . The first sentence of (7a), she didn't win, changes the epistemic base R to R#, effectively inducing a new forcing relation y#, relative to which (3a) fails (whether or not it holds for the initial relation y).
2
Notice that if we are to make sense of discourses such as (7b), the first sentence in which rules out possibilities entertained in the second, we must keep the epistemic base for (3a)/(4a) separate from the modal base for (3b)/(4b), called metaphysical in CON2.
3 Accordingly, we shall assume y comes with two sets R e and R m of schedules specifying the epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, respectively. To avoid cluttering the notation, we will refrain from hanging the sets R e , R m as subscripts on y. Such a practice would be useful were we to encode a dynamic interpretation of conjunction involving changes to R e (and possibly also to R m , s and t). But the present paper stops short of that, keeping R e and R m frozen. 4 Holding R e , R m constant, we will have enough to do sorting out complications involving time, the perfect and metaphysical might (omitted in Veltman 1984 Veltman , 1996 .
TEMPORAL PROPERTIES IN CON2
The semantic set-up in CON2 takes the following ingredients for granted:
(i) a set PT of temporal points/moments/instants linearly ordered by a, and a set TI 4 Pow(PT) -f;g of times consisting of non-empty subsets t of PT such that for every z 2 PT, z 2 t whenever x a z a y for some x; y 2 t (that is, time is a non-empty a-interval) (ii) sets WO, EV and ST of worlds, of events and of states, respectively, along with a function s:
) that specifies the temporal trace s(e, w) 2 TI [ f;g of an event or state e in world w, where sðe; wÞ ¼ ; iff e is not realized in w; the intuition behind s(e, w) 2 TI being that e is a single token/ occurrence in w (as opposed to a type that recurs in w).
CON2 calls a function P from worlds (i) eventive if for every world w, P(w) is a unary predicate on events (so P(w)(e) is either true or false for every event e) (ii) stative if for every world w, P(w) is a unary predicate on states (so P(w)(e) is either true or false for every state e) (iii) temporal if for every world w, P(w) is a unary predicate on times (so P(w)(t) is either true or false for every time t) (iv) a property if P is eventive or stative or temporal.
To turn any property to a temporal property, a world-time pair w, t is assigned sets EV(w, t) and ST(w, t) of events and states as follows. An event is located at w, t if its temporal trace in w is contained in t Evðw; tÞ ¼ fe 2 Ev j ; 6 ¼ sðe; wÞ 4 tg whereas a state is located in w, t if its temporal trace in w overlaps with t Stðw; tÞ ¼ fe 2 St j sðe; wÞ \ t 6 ¼ ;g:
(Viewed from outside t, events give the impression of being bounded while states do not. Events occur, states hold.) A property P is then mapped to the temporal property kwktAT(t, w, P) by existentially quantifying over the events and states located in w, t ATðt; w; PÞ ¼ ðde 2 Evðw; tÞÞ PðwÞðeÞ if P is eventive ðde 2 Stðw; tÞÞ PðwÞðeÞ if P is stative PðwÞðtÞ if P is temporal:
AT is used to formalize both the perfect and the modals. A function PERF mapping properties P to temporal properties is defined by ðPERF PÞðwÞðtÞ ¼ ðdt# a tÞ ATðt#; w; PÞ where the linear order a on PT is extended to a relation on TI by quantifying universally over the points t a t# iff ð"x 2 tÞð"x# 2 t#Þ x a x#:
To analyse modals, a modal base function MB is assumed that maps a world-time pair (w, t) to a set of worlds, relative to which a function MIGHT MB maps a property P to the temporal property satisfying ðMIGHT MB PÞðwÞðtÞ ¼ ðdw# 2 MBðw; tÞÞ ATðt N ; w#; PÞ where (expanding time forward, as in Abusch 1998) 5 t N is the indefinite extension of t to the future fx 2 Ti j ðdy 2 tÞy d xg 5 Gennari (2003) makes a claim related to the idea that modals expand time forward.
(with y d x abbreviating 'y a x or x ¼ y'). To capture historical necessity, worlds are bundled at each time t by an equivalence relation ' t (on WO) satisfying (9).
(9) For every temporal propertyP of interest, PðwÞðtÞ iff ð"w# ' t wÞPðw#ÞðtÞ:
The qualification 'of interest' in (9) is necessary to allow for branching in the future (i.e. beyond t); otherwise, ' t ' s satisfying (9) must be equality, in view of uninteresting temporal properties such as those given, for every world w, by ð"w# 2 WOÞð"t 2 TIÞPðw#ÞðtÞ iff w# ¼ w:
The metaphysical alternatives to w at t are restricted to worlds that share the same t-history as w.
(10) ð"w# 2 MBðw; tÞÞð"t#atÞ w ' t# w# for metaphysical MB.
Consequently, if the 'present perspective'
ðMIGHT MB ðPERF PÞÞðwÞðtÞ ¼ ðdw# 2 MBðw; tÞÞðdt# a tÞ ATðt#; w#; PÞ is to differ from (PERF P))(w)(t), then MB had better not be metaphysical. Not so for the ''past perspective''
ðPERFðMIGHT MB PÞÞðwÞðtÞ ¼ ðdt# a tÞðdw# 2 MBðw; t#ÞÞ ATðt# N ; w#; PÞ as PERF pushes t back to t#, which MIGHT then expands forward. Hence, CON2 disambiguates (2) by deriving the epistemic reading from (4a) and the metaphysical reading from (4b).
A REFORMULATION IN TERMS OF SCHEDULES
We are at Step 1 of Table 1 , the point of which is to reformulate the temporal properties u(w)(t) from section 2 in terms of satisfaction
where s is a schedule capturing w. To speak properly about schedules, we need to specify a set ED of eventuality-descriptions, relative to which schedules are subsets of TI 3 ED. Given a set EP of eventive and stative properties (as in section 2), let ED be the set of names _ P of P 2 EP,
with _ P 6 ¼ _ P# for P 6 ¼ P#: Then every world w induces the schedule s w;EP;s ¼ fðt; _ PÞ j P 2 EP and de½PðwÞðeÞ and sðe; wÞ ¼ tg:
As is common in the literature (e.g. Dowty 1979), let us assume that states are divisible in the sense of (11).
(11) For all e 2 ST, P 2 EP, w 2 WO and t 2 TI, if P(w)(e) and t 4 s(e,w) then there is an e# 2 ST such that P(w)(e#) and t ¼ s(e#,w).
Given (11), it is easy to prove Proposition 1. For all P 2 EP, w 2 WO and t 2 TI, ATðt; w; PÞ iff ðdt# 4 tÞ s w;EP;s ðt#; _ PÞ:
Let us treat ED as the set of atomic sentences in a language U ED generated by the clause whenever u 2 U; so are : u 4 ; PerfðuÞ; AEmaeu; ½mu; AEeaeu; ½eu:
The intent is that u 4 express the step from s to AT in section 2, and m and e label metaphysical and epistemic modals (with diamond/d and box/" 6 forms AEÁae and [Á]) respectively. To be more precise, let us agree that for s 4 TI 3 ED, t 2 TI and u 2 U, Next, let us spell out the modal base functions MB(w, t) above, given two sets W m , W e 4 Pow(TI 3 ED) of schedules for the metaphysical and epistemic possibilities respectively. To impose historical necessity on the metaphysical alternatives, let % t hold between schedules that are the same up to times at s# % t s iff ð"t# a tÞð"u 2 EDÞ sðt#; uÞ iff s#ðt#; uÞ:
7 Observe that if t has left end point l, and flg 2 TI. then we can make do in (12) with t#dflg in place of t#d o t: But, as we cannot, in general, reduce t to a point, and as it is not inconceivable that we may wish to eliminate the slack in AT (analysed in Proposition 1 via _ P 4 Þ; I have kept the Plotkin pre-order above.
The metaphysical alternatives are then defined from % t and W m by strengthening (10) Henceforth, we may assume that~4 ðPowðTi 3 EDÞ 3 TiÞ 3 U is determined by a choice W m , W e of a pair of sets of schedules. Let us write P for an element of ED (dropping the dot on _ P 2 EP) and write w instead of s, construing worlds (from here on) as schedules. As hinted in the introduction above, 8 a pair (u, t) 2 U 3 TI induces a change in the epistemic modal base from W e to fw 2 W e j w; t~ug:
Whether the set W m of metaphysical possibilities should be updated, I am less confident. It seems to me quite reasonable to equate W m with the initial set of epistemic possibilities, and to assume that while W e shrinks, W m stays fixed-so that W e 4 W m . But I will not insist on that below.
A PERSISTENT GENERALIZATION
We are at Step 2 of What schedules are induced by worlds? Let us call a set S of schedules an anti-chain if no two distinct elements in S are related by 4 that is, for all s, s# 2 S, if s 4 s# then s ¼ s#. We may assume that a set of worlds (with worlds construed as schedules) is an anti-chain, by arranging, for example, the eventuality descriptions ED to come with a 'negation' map Á : ED/ED and excluding from schedules relations s such that for some t and P, both s(t, P) and sðt; PÞ: 9 Now, the 'persistent generalisation' from which the present section gets its title is the definition of a forcing relation y 4 PowðTi 3 EDÞ 3 ðTi 3 UÞ from a pair W m , W e of sets of schedules (determining a satisfaction relation~according to the previous section) such that Part (a) of Proposition 2 is (as indicated in the introduction) what we mean by y being persistent, while part (b) is the sense in which we get a generalization of~. The shift in t from the left of~to the right of y is designed to isolate (and thereby highlight) the partial order 4 on schedules (to the left of y). The idea is to reduce the schedules s to the left of y so that they have just enough weight to force the pairs t, u to the right of y. 9 More specifically, we might pair each eventuality description P with + (for truth) or ÿ (for falsehood), defining ðP; +Þ ¼ ðP; ÿÞ and ðP; ÿÞ ¼ ðP; +Þ: The doubling of ED here corresponds in data semantics (Veltman 1984) to flipping y for a notion of falsehood (complementing truth).
Notice that there is nothing anomalous about both w(t, P 4 ) and wðt; P 4 Þ holding. This explains the elimination in section 3 of the slack in AT, before its re-introduction via the mapping u1u 4 :
(13) For all w 2 W m [ W e , t 2 TI and u 2 U, w; t~u iff ðds 2 BÞðs 4 w and s y t; uÞ:
More on (13) in the next section.
In the meantime, let us attend to the definition of y. The nonmodal clauses are as in (i)-(iii) of section 3 s y t; P iff sðt; PÞ for P 2 ED s y t; u 4 iff ðdt# 4 tÞ s y t#; u s y t; PerfðuÞ iff ðdt# a tÞ s y t#; u:
For the modalities, we need to fix sets R m and R e of schedules, just as we did for~with W m and W e . To establish Proposition 2, we must choose R m ¼ YW m and R e ¼ YW e . But it will be useful to define y independently of W m , W e , assuming only that we have fixed some sets R m and R e of schedules. The modal base functions mb a (for a 2 fm, eg) are as in x3, with W a replaced by R a mb m ðs; tÞ ¼ fs# 2 R m j s# % t sg mb e ðs; tÞ ¼ R e :
However, the inclusion of schedules that are not 4-maximal leads to a couple of complications. First, there is the question of persistence. While this is no problem for epistemic modalities, we need to be careful about metaphysical modalities. To hardwire persistence, let us write # for the restriction of to R m [ R e s #s# iff s# 4 s and s; s# 2 R m [ R e and add the quantification "r # s in 10 s y t; AEaaeu iff ð"r #sÞðds# 2 mb a ðr; tÞÞðdt#d o tÞ s# y t#; u:
(For a ¼ e or for world-schedules s, the prefix ("r # s) makes no difference; we add it above for the sake of uniformity.) A second complication arises with interpreting the universal modality s y t; ½au iff ð"r #sÞð"s# 2 mb a ðr; tÞÞðdt#d o tÞ s# y t t#; u where the modification y t on the right hand side takes the partiality of s# into account, allowing s# to be substituted by an s$ # s# with s$ % t s# to ensure that time is extended sufficiently far beyond t s# y t t#; u iff ðds$ #s#Þðs$ % t s# and s$ y t#; uÞ:
This complication does not arise in AEaaeu, where s# is quantified existentially (rather than universally, as in [a]u) and can absorb the choice of s$. With the appropriate definitions in place, we can prove Proposition 2 by a routine induction on u (for R m ¼ YW m and R e ¼ YW e ).
RECONSTRUCTING WORLDS
We have arrived at
Step 3 of Table 1 . Having defined y from any two sets R m , R e of schedules (while suggesting choices of these in Proposition 2 given by~), we may ask how to extract~from y without assuming y has been formed from~. Since y and~are determined by R m , R e and W e , W m respectively, the question becomes how to define W e , W m from R m , R e . Let us record our goal as such that s 4 s#: (14) is a very strong assumption that excludes interesting choices of R.
Indeed, suppose every schedule in R were finite, but that each one were properly contained in another one. Then [R would be empty, leaving out infinite schedules
Such objects [ i>0 s i are captured in the usual completeness theorems in logic as maximal consistent extensions. For reasons to be explained shortly, forcing arguments refine the notion of a maximal consistent extension to that of a generic set (e.g. Keisler 1973)-generic not in the sense of 'lions have manes' but rather in connection with y. To spell out this connection, it is useful to extend y to formulas u 2 U with negation : s y t; :u iff ð"r #sÞ not r y t; u (recalling that # is the restriction of to R m [ R e ). Now, G is generic if (i) for all s 2 G and s# 2 R m [ R e , s# 4 s implies s# 2 G (ii) every pair s, s# 2 G has a common extension s$ 2 G: s$ s [ s# (iii) for all u 2 U and t 2 TI, there is an s 2 G such that either s y t, u or s y t, :u.
Conditions ( Under these assumptions, Proposition 3 can be proved along standard lines in forcing, using the persistence of y (Proposition 2(a) above) and the fact that every s 2 R m [R e belongs to a generic set, provided TI 3 ED is finite or countable (see e.g. Lemma 1.4 in Keisler 1973, page 101) . Two other facts, (15) and (16), are worth recording.
(15) The forcing of doubly negated formulas s y t; ::u iff ð"r #sÞðdp #rÞ p y t; u reduces (as usual) to generic sets s y t; ::u iff ð" generic G such that s 2 GÞ [ G~t; u: Because s# picks out more schedules that force t, u than w. By the persistence of y, any schedule bigger than s# must force t, u, including w, all schedules bigger than w (of which there are none, if w is a world), and other worlds bigger than s# (of which there may be any number). In other words, small is beautiful. We should try to make a schedule s that forces t, u smaller (and not only bigger, as we do when forming worlds via generic sets). With this in mind, let us close by considering the prospects of truncating schedules. More precisely, given a schedule s and time t, let s t be the restriction of s to times a or 4 t s t ¼ fðt#; PÞ 2 s j t# a t or t# 4 tg:
The question is: for which u 2 U can we count on (17)? (17) s y t; u iff s t y t; u (17) goes through without a hitch for nearly all the clauses of y. The only problematic cases are the metaphysical modalities AEmaeu and [m]u, which can be saved if we strengthen the prefix "r # s to "r # s t , yielding s y t; AEmaeu iff ð"r #s t Þðds# 2 mb m ðr; tÞÞðdt#d o tÞ s# y t#; u and s y t; ½mu iff ð"r #s t Þð"s# 2 mb m ðr; tÞÞðdt#d o tÞ s#y t t#; u:
With this modification, 11 we secure (17) for all u 2 U, without (remarkably) losing any of our previous results (including Propositions 2 and 3, and (15), (16)). Moreover, suppose we introduce a fresh symbol R ; ED (for Reichenbach's reference time) and define an R-sked to be a relation of the form s½t ¼ s t [ fðt; RÞg for some schedule s and time t. Then we can encode y in statements s 8 u (pronounced ''s pins u'') between R-skeds s and formulas u satisfying (18). But that is immediate from (17) and R ; ED. Alternatively (instead of deriving 8 from y), we might define 8 from scratch 12 and read (18) from right to left as a definition of y from 8. This route to y, 11 As before, the prefix "r# s t has no effect on the epistemic modalities, so we can replace m above by a 2 fm, eg for the sake of uniformity.
12 This is easy, albeit tedious. Given an R-sked s, let us write last(s) for the unique time t such that s(t, R), and write s R for the schedule s -f(last(s), R)g obtained from s by removing R. Then s8P iff sðlastðsÞ; PÞ for P 2 ED s8u 4 iff ðdt 2 domainðsÞÞ t 4 lastðsÞ and s R ½t8u s8PerfðuÞ iff ðdt 2 domainðsÞÞ t a lastðsÞ and s R ½t8u s8AEaaeu iff ð"r # sÞðds# 2 mb o a ðr; lastðsÞÞÞs#8u s8½au iff ð"r # sÞð"s# 2 mb however, depends on (17), which may well fail for u incorporating the progressive. 
